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ABSTRACT 
The rules applicable to arbitration of both hard and soft law share 
the importance of the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. A 
particular treatment of a type of conflict of interest that may occur during 
the arbitration procedure is that regulated by Rules 5 and 6 of the IBA 
Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration (2013), 
referring to a modification in the team of representatives or legal advisors 
of one of the parties that causes a conflict of interest in one of the 
arbitrators that seriously questions his independence or impartiality, and 
that consequently opens the door to his possible disqualification, and to 
the need to protect the integrity of the arbitration procedure by the 
arbitrators. 
In this paper, we analyze if the standards provided in Rules 5 and 6 
to resolve the conflict of interest between lawyers and arbitrators have 
received a favorable response within the arbitration community. And if so, 
whether an international consensus can be achieved that can serve as a 
model for a future Code of Ethics at a truly transnational level.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The rules applicable to arbitration of both hard and soft law share 
the importance of the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. The 
principles of independence and impartiality are ethical principles of 
arbitration2, upon which its legitimacy depends3. The arbitrators are 
expected to avoid direct or indirect conflicts of interest4. Obviously, not 
only arbitrators should avoid conflicts of interest, but also should lawyers. 
A particular treatment of a type of conflict of interest that may occur 
during the arbitration procedure is that regulated by the IBA Guidelines 
                                                          
2 This paper is written under research project DER2016-78572-P. 
The scholars turn the ethics of the arbitrators in relation to the obligations of disclosure 
and independence and impartiality. Thus, among others: Ramón MULLERAT, Ethical 
Rules for Arbitrators, Anuario de Justicia Alternativa, 2005, pp.77 et seq; José Carlos 
FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS, Clearer Ethics Guidelines and Comparative Standards for 
Arbitrators, Liber Amicorum Bernardo Cremades, Madrid, La Ley, 2010, p.416; and 
Silvano DOMENICO ORSI, Ethics in International Arbitration: New Considerations 
for Arbitrator´s and Counsel, Arbitration Brief, 2013, vol.3, issue 1, pp.92 et seq, 
proposing the creation of a Global Ethic Code (id., pp.106 et seq). 
3 See: Ignacio MADALENA/Nicolás RIVERA MONTOYA, Función y deberes del 
árbitro. In FLORES SENTÍES, H., (editor), Retos contemporáneos del arbitraje internacional. 
Ciudad de México: Tirant lo Blanch, 2018, p.76. 
4 Catherine ROGERS, Ética del abogado en el arbitraje internacional. In FLORES 
SENTÍES, H., (editor), Retos contemporáneos del arbitraje internacional. Ciudad de México: 
Tirant lo Blanch, 2018, pp.285-330; S. WILSKE, y S. HUGHES, Tácticas arbitrales de 
guerrilla y estándares mínimos de ética en el arbitraje internacional. In FLORES 
SENTÍES, H., (editor), Retos contemporáneos del arbitraje internacional. Ciudad de México: 
Tirant lo Blanch, 2018, pp.367-394; and Günther J. HORVATH/Stephen WILSKE, 
Guerrilla Tactics in International Arbitration. Wolters Kluwer, 2013, pp.26-27. 
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on Party Representation in International Arbitration (2013) (hereinafter, 
Guidelines or Rules), Rules 5 and 65, which indicate that: 
“5. Once the Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted, a person should not accept 
representation of a Party in the arbitration when a relationship exists between 
the person and an Arbitrator that would create a conflict of interest, unless none 
of the Parties objects after proper disclosure. 
6. The Arbitral Tribunal may, in case of breach of Guideline 5, take measures 
appropriate to safeguard the integrity of the proceedings, including the exclusion 
of the new Party Representative from participating in all or part of the arbitral 
proceedings”. 
As seen, there is a situation where a modification in the team of 
representatives or legal advisors of one of the parties that causes a conflict 
of interest in relation to one of the arbitrators that seriously undermines 
his independence or impartiality6, and that consequently opens the door 
to his possible disqualification, and to the need to protect the integrity of 
the arbitration procedure by the arbitrators. 
These are situations in which the Arbitral Tribunal has already been 
formally constituted, and the legal representatives of the parties have also 
been fixed or formally determined; Typically, lawyers are already 
appointed when the arbitrators are chosen, and, in fact, in the request for 
arbitration and in their response, such data is normally provided7. 
As we said, the question arises when, during the procedure, there is 
some change or modification in relation to the initially appointed 
representatives of the parties; several different situations may occur: 
i) Inclusion of a lawyer in the legal team that will attend the hearing 
on the merits of the matter. This was what happened in the famous 
                                                          
5 The fact that the comments to these rules indicate that: “In such case, the Arbitral 
Tribunal may, if compelling circumstances so justify, and where it has found that it has 
the requisite authority, consider excluding the new representative from participating in 
all or part of the arbitral proceedings”, has led some authors to question whether the 
guidelines really grant such power to the arbitral tribunal. See. Felix DASSER, A Critical 
Analysis of the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation. The Sense and Non-Sense of 
Guidelines, Rules and other Para-Regulatory texts in International Arbitration. ASA 
Special Series nº37, ASA, Juris, 2015, p.41. 
6 In this work we are not going to make a distinction between the terms 
independence/impartiality, a debated issue, as it is well known. There is abundant legal 
literature in this regard, but see: Alfonso GÓMEZ-ACEBO, Party-Appointed Arbitrators in 
International Commercial Arbitration, Wolters Kluwer, 2016, pp.69-96; and Carlos 
MATHEUS, La independencia e imparcialidad del árbitro en el arbitraje doméstico e internacional, 
Palestra, 2016, pp.179 et seq. 
7 This is the case in most arbitration regulations. For example, Rules of the Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), arts.4.3. b) y 5.1 b).  
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Hrvatska Case8, where, just ten days before the hearing, which had been 
scheduled for two weeks, the defendant´s legal representation sent the list 
of people including the name of Mr. David Mildon QC of the Essex Court 
Chambers in London. The conflict of interest arose between Mr. Mildon 
and the President of the Arbitral Tribunal which was "a door tenant at the 
same Chambers". 
ii) Modification of the legal team by including a lawyer not initially 
considered. Unlike the previous case, there is an alteration with the 
objective of formally introducing a new lawyer into the legal team. This 
happened in another well-known case, the Rompetrol Case9, where the main 
lawyer in the case communicated her decision to leave the firm and so a 
new lawyer began to lead the team. This new lawyer, Mr. Legum, had 
worked for 4 years and until seven months before at the same law firm of 
the arbitrator appointed by the plaintiff. 
iii) Change of the law firm: without modifying the names of the 
persons in charge of the defense of one of the parties, there is a variation 
of the law firm responsible for the defense. It is, consequently, the 
integration of the original team of lawyers in a new office that creates a 
conflict of interest with one of the arbitrators. Conflicts of interest that 
arise may be of greater or lesser intensity: the arbitrator is a partner or 
works in the firm, the arbitrator is a counsel of the firm, the arbitrator 
performs advisory work for the firm, the arbitrator has relatives in the firm 
or friendly relations with lawyers of the new office, etc. 
Essentially, the conflict between the arbitrator and the lawyer enters 
the red list10 or the orange list of the 2014 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration11. 
These newly described situations, even though not frequent in 
practice, are not at all unknown given the duration of the arbitration 
proceedings and the global framework of the practice and the mobility of 
lawyers. As the Introduction to the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest, No. 1 points out: 
                                                          
8 Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, d.d. v. The Republic of Slovenia, (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24) 
Tribunal's Ruling regarding the participation of David Mildon QC in further stages of 
the proceedings, 6 May 2008. 
9 The Rompetrol Group, N.V., v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Decision of the 
Tribunal on the Participation of a Counsel, 14 January 2010. 
10 Thus, the following circumstances that are related to the issue at hand are listed in the 
waiver red list: “2.3 Arbitrator’s relationship with the parties or counsel. 
2.3.1 The arbitrator currently represents or advises one of the parties, or an affiliate of 
one of the parties. 
2.3.2 The arbitrator currently represents or advises the lawyer or law firm acting as 
counsel for one of the parties. 
2.3.3 The arbitrator is a lawyer in the same law firm as the counsel to one of the parties”. 
11 Within the orange list, the circumstances indicated in Guideline 3.3 stand out. 
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"The growth of international business, including larger corporate groups and 
international law firms, has generated more disclosures and resulted in 
increased complexity in the analysis of disclosure and conflict of interest issues”. 
It is uncertain to what extent, when the conflict reaches an 
arbitrator and a single lawyer, it must affect all of them without having in 
view the concrete conflict that arises. However, as a general rule, the 
situation should be addressed through a conservative solution and only in 
extreme cases should the removal of the lawyer who created the conflict 
be decided12. 
Returning to the text of the IBA, the response given by the IBA 
Guidelines on Party Representation to the problem at hand derives from 
case law regarding investment arbitration and takes advantage especially 
of the solution given to this issue in one of the best-known cases, the 
Hvratska Case. 
In general terms, The IBA Guidelines on Party Representation has 
generated a good deal of controversy among international scholars. We 
do, however, wonder if the standards provided in Rules 5 and 6 to resolve 
the conflict of interest between lawyers and arbitrators have received a 
favorable response within the arbitration community. And if so, whether 
an international consensus can be achieved that can serve as a model for 
a future Code of Ethics at a truly transnational level. The creation of an 
International Code of Ethics is a matter of a hot discussion presently and 
it will be one of the main topics of discussion among the international 
arbitration community in the coming years. 
There are several authors who have supported the idea of a Code of 
Ethics in international arbitration. We highlight, for the purposes of this 
work, the authors who conclude on this need by confronting, above all, 
the cases related to investment arbitration, Hvratska, Rompetrol and 
Fraport13, and the different solutions that the courts reached in these 
cases14. However, it should be noted that the Fraport Case refers to a 
                                                          
12 Another approach in the US seems to be followed, as noted by A.S. RAU, Arbitrators 
without powers?. Disqualifying counsel in arbitral proceedings, The Center for Global 
Energy, International Arbitration and Environmental Law, The University of Texas at Austin 
School of Law. Research Paper No. 2014-01, June 2014, nº38 in relation to USA case 
law: “In fact, in most cases where a court has decided to “disqualify” counsel, the result 
is that the entire law firm is expected to withdraw completely from the representation---
the disqualification “radiates” out to disable the firm from accepting the matter, treating 
those who practice together, no matter how large the firm, as “one lawyer”. 
13 Fraport Ag Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/25) (Annulment Proceeding). Decision on application for disqualification 
of counsel, 18 September 2008. 
14 Doak BISHOP, Ethics in International Arbitration, p.10. The author indicates that:“the 
arbitrators found themselves blown out to sea and ill-equipped with nothing more than a coastal chart. 
And therein lies the problem. The 3 tribunals —faced with similar issues— created 3 different solutions 
(…). Simply put, the arbitrators needed a sextant and a star chart — a Code of Conduct for Counsel” 
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different conflict: the one that arises between the new lawyer and one of 
the parties to the proceedings due to an issue arising from the duty of 
confidentiality, and that raises further problems related to the malpractice 
of lawyers, such as the discussion about whether it is possible to resolve 
these issues by arbitration, the powers of arbitrators to sanction these 
behaviors, and interference with the standards of professional ethics. 
These issues, and others related to the lawyer's malpractice -such as 
the so-called guerrilla tactics- are the ones that are receiving the most 
criticism from a sector of the scholars (infra 2), and converge with the 
conflict that concerns us in this paper in the affectation of the integrity of 
the arbitration procedure and the fair conduct of the proceedings. 
2. CONSENSUS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
COMMUNITY: REALITY OR CHIMERA? 
Statistics on the use of soft law instruments leave us with less 
optimistic figures in relation to the IBA Guidelines on Party 
Representation in international arbitration, as it is the least used 
instrument, compared to other texts of the IBA15. One reason is the fact 
that, for a reputed sector of the international arbitration community, the 
inclusion of rules about the professional conduct of lawyers has been very 
problematic, since they are understood to be beyond the scope of control 
of the IBA, of the parties and of the arbitral tribunal. 
Firstly, the criticisms of the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation 
are framed in a general debate about the role that soft law instruments can 
play in practice, especially with regard to the soft law rules that will be 
applied during the arbitration procedure. This debate, that concerns the 
very essence of arbitration regulation, is not so much about discussing 
singular provisions adopted in the soft law texts, but about whether to 
move towards a regulatory model in arbitration. The debate is about 
regulation itself16. This question, however, is outside the scope of this 
work. 
                                                          
(id., p.8); and Catherine A. ROGERS, Ethics in International Arbitration, Oxford University 
Press, 2014, nº6.151-6.157.  
15 Report on the reception of the IBA Arbitration Soft Law Products (2016), where it is 
stated that: “the 57% of the arbitrations referred/used the IBA Guidelines on Conflict of Interest. 
This was the most used soft law instrument. 48% IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, y 16% IBA 
Guidelines on Party Representation”. 
16 Michael SCHNEIDER, President´s Message, Yet another opportunity to waste time 
and money on procedural skirmishes: The IBA Guidelines on Party Representation, 31 
ASA BULLETIN 3/2013 (SEPTEMBER), p.498: “But the objections which must be raised 
against the Guidelines go beyond some problematic provisions. It is the regulation itself which causes 
Mischief”. And id., p.500: “However, regulating the conduct of party representatives as the IBA now 
has done is the wrong answer and one can only hope that the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation 
quickly fall into oblivion or, better, never are applied”. 
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Secondly, another of the criticisms of the IBA's text reaches the 
amalgam that occurs in its rules between issues that are said to be 
essentially different: the question of the conflict of interests between 
lawyers and arbitrators derived from the hypotheses outlined above and 
that affect questions of independence and impartiality of the arbitrators, 
and other issues related to conflicts of interest that occur between lawyers 
and the parties to the procedure, such as those arising from the violation 
of the duty of confidentiality. In addition, there is another series of 
conflicts that may occur during the procedure and that affects all of its 
participants – conflicts derived from a bad practice or inappropriate 
behavior of one of the parties during the procedure; in these cases, both 
arbitrators and the other party of the procedure are affected.  
Thus, the Swiss doctrine, which has been especially critical towards 
the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation, both in general and in 
particular in the case of Guideline 6, which is relevant to the conflict of 
interest at hand, gives us the key to their main concern about the Rules at 
this point: 
“At the origin of this misconception is the amalgamation in the Guidelines 
between rules of professional conduct and rules regulating the arbitration 
procedure. While the latter may be regulated by the parties to an arbitration 
and by the arbitral tribunal appointed by them, the former fall within the 
responsibility of those professional bodies that regulate the exercise of the legal 
profession. The IBA has no power to interfere with these professional 
regulations, nor do the parties and arbitral tribunals. This gives rises to 
difficulties which are reflected in several provisions of the Guidelines”17.  
Adding, also, the rejection of the remedies provided, and particularly 
to the power given to the arbitrators to discipline lawyers by imposing 
sanctions: 
“The “remedies” – the term “sanctions” would seem more appropriate –
include admonitions, inferences, cost sanctions and “any other appropriate 
measure in order to preserve the fairness and integrity of the proceedings”; 
Guideline 6 even provides for the possibility of the “exclusion” of a Party 
Representative”18. 
However, the issue is clarified because it is not so much that the 
arbitrators do not have such powers, when, in fact, it is understood that 
they have them. Instead, the issue is that those powers are specifically 
mentioned in the Guidelines, thus opening the door to greater litigation 
and possibilities of disturbances during the procedure. Thus, it is indicated 
that: 
                                                          
17 SCHNEIDER, President´s Message, p.499. 
18 SCHNEIDER, President´s Message, p.499-500. 
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“Many of the sanctions for misconduct provided by the Guidelines may be 
available to arbitrators already today as part of an arbitrator’s duty and power 
to ensure the “integrity and fairness of the arbitral proceedings”, as specified in 
Guideline 1. Occasionally such powers may have been recognised or even used 
in the past. However, once they are spelled out in guidelines and widely 
publicised, they raise the appetite of litigators and motions for their application 
risk to become ordinary tools in the proceedings, causing additional waste of 
time and money and contributing further to the disenchantment of the users 
with international arbitration as widely practiced today”19. 
Basically, the aversion of the Swiss Arbitration Association (ASA) 
toward the IBA Guidelines focuses, above all, on the excessive power 
granted to arbitrators to sanction the misconduct or unethical conduct of 
lawyers. These are issues that are not the responsibility of the arbitrators, 
which should focus on the resolution of the merits of the case. They are 
not competent, in the opinion of the ASA, because those are matters that 
are regulated by professional associations which are also the appropriate 
bodies to impose sanctions, or because it is ultimately up to the courts to 
decide them20.  
That is, the severe criticisms made to the IBA text are not related to 
the solution given to the conflict of interests that concerns us, which is 
more linked to the question of the independence and impartiality of the 
arbitrators than to a question related to the ethics of the lawyers21. This 
does not prevent, but on the contrary, advises that these issues are 
addressed within a future Code of Ethics because, as already stated, 
questions of ethics in arbitration can touch upon the nuclear issue of the 
independence and impartiality of the arbitrators. At the same time, it must 
be recognized that there is a very thin line of distinction and there may be 
border situations between these two issues.  
                                                          
19 SCHNEIDER, President´s Message, p.500. 
20 Swiss Arbitration Association (ASA), ASA Board Position, 
GEISINGER/SCHNEIDER/DASSER, IBA Guidelines on party representation in 
international arbitration comments and recommendations by the Board of the Swiss 
Arbitration Association (ASA), nº5, available at the ASA web site, nº1, y nº2. See also: 
Elliott GEISINGER, President´s Message, Counsel Ethics in International Arbitration 
–Could One Take Things a Step Further?, available at the ASA web site, pp.453-454; 
DASSER, A critical analysis, p.39; and Domitille BAIZEAU, The IBA Guidelines on 
Party Representation in International Arbitration: A Plea for Caution, BCDR (Bahrain 
Chamber for Dispute Resolution)  International Arbitration Review, 2015, nº2, pp.351-
354. 
21 In agreement: Anne-Carole CREMADES, The Creation of a Global Arbitration Ethics 
Council: a Truly Global Solution to a Global Problem, 24 Noviembre 2015; and Elliott 
GEISINGER, Soft Law” and Hard Questions: ASA´s Initiative in the Debate of 
Counsel´s Ethics in International Arbitration, The Sense and Non-Sense of Guidelines, 
Rules and Other Para-Regulatory Texts in International Arbitration. ASA Special Series, 
nº37, 2015, p.19. See. General Rule 7 b) IBA Guidelines on the Conflict of Interests. 
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Few authors have realized this, and curiously enough, there were 
those in favor of not regulating arbitration excessively22. So, even the 
opponents of the IBA Rules do not question the benefits of Guidelines 5 
and 6 (or the other texts that have decided to follow the same solutions, 
such in the case of the Arbitration Rules of the London Court of 
International Arbitration) (LCIA) 23. A different matter is whether the 
solution must be in the hands of the arbitrators or of the arbitral 
institutions24-although the international consensus is that it is for the 
arbitrators to decide-, or if these rules are suitable to become the model 
for a regulation Global international arbitration25. 
Be that as it may, it is found that the arbitration community, 
including the most critical sectors of the IBA Rules on Party 
Representation, mostly agree that the arbitrators have the duty to protect 
the integrity of the procedure when the modification in the legal team 
causes a conflict of interest with the arbitrator by which its independence 
and impartiality is called into question and that this is a matter that ought 
to be subject to regulation. 
3. THE CONSENSUS ON SOFT LAW INSTRUMENTS 
One of the criticisms made to procedural soft law and particularly 
the IBA Rules on Party Representation is the possibility that multiple 
regulations would lead to contradictory or irreconcilable solutions to one 
another:  
“initiatives by individual associations like the IBA or arbitration institutions 
like the LCIA generate a risk of fragmentation between different – and 
potentially contradictory – “rules” or “codes”. This in turn would likely 
undermine the very legitimacy of the rules/codes that may be adopted, since 
offending counsel could point to differences to argue that there is no international 
consensus”26.  
                                                          
22 In a way, it seems that the critics of the IBA Rules are also in favor, see: for example 
DASSER, A critical analysis, pp.55-57, that in relation to the conflict of interest between 
lawyers and arbitrators derived from the situations contemplated in the cases Hvratska 
and Rompetrol, the author does believe that they can be addressed through a simple 
modification of the arbitration rules. 
23 GEISINGER, Soft Law, p.19. 
24 See GEISINGER, Soft Law, pp.19-20, considering that these issues must be kept 
within the orbit of the independence and impartiality of the arbitrators (reasons why the 
LCIA approach seems acceptable), and rejecting that the arbitrators are the ones who 
decide that issue but the arbitral institutions. Id., pp. 22-25 contrary to the arbitrators 
assuming a decision-making power in relation to issues related to attorney´s ethics. 
25 DASSER, A critical analysis, p.53, considers that they should not be a model, especially, 
he thinks, not in the case of the Guidelines that are a recipe for additional disputes and 
disruptions. 
26 GEISINGER, President´s Message, p.454. 
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In view of the above, it is necessary to assess whether the reported 
situation occurs in the soft law instruments in relation to the purpose of 
this work. We anticipate that this is not the case and that an international 
consensus can be derived among the different instruments that regulate 
this issue and that are based on the innovative model of the IBA Rules on 
Party Representation27.  
3.1. THE INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE OF THE IBA GUIDELINES ON 
PARTY REPRESENTATION  
We do not refer in this section to those instruments that expressly 
regulate the hypotheses object of this work, but those other instruments 
that indirectly integrate the same solution as the IBA Rules when 
incorporating by referencing the said instrument and, therefore, Rules 5 
and 6 will also apply. Recently, we are watching the indirect incorporation 
or the incorporation by reference of several instruments of soft law into 
arbitration rules but also through other kinds of instruments. It is the 
arbitration institutions themselves that have decided to support the use of 
arbitration soft law by increasing its visibility and practical importance. 
This incorporation by reference is made in relation to self-created texts 
and incorporating texts prepared by other institutions. 
For example, Article 5 of the Code of Ethics of the Philippine 
Dispute Resolution Center (PDRC) adopts several instruments:  
“PDRCI hereby adopts as its Code of Ethics for Arbitration the: (a) Rules 
of Ethics for International Arbitrators adopted by the International Bar 
Association (“IBA”); (b) 2014 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration; and (c) IBA Guidelines on Party Representation 
in International Arbitration, to the extent that they do not conflict with any 
provision of Philippine law”.  
                                                          
27 It is precisely considered that certain ethical standards have been consolidated in the 
arbitration, analyzing article 21 of the Rules of Arbitration of the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute 
Resolution: James CASTELLO, Party Representation: Does Article 21 Mark a Trend?, 
Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution, International Arbitration Review, December 
2017, vol.4, nº2, p.358. This rule includes also situations different from those 
contemplated in sections 5 and 6 of the IBA Guidelines related to the behavior of 
dishonest lawyers, malpractice, and guerrilla tactics, which can be sanctioned by the 
arbitral tribunal. 
In the doctrine it has been considered that Rules 5 and 6 the IBA Guidelines “and now, 
at least arguably, as reflecting established international arbitral practice” (BAIZEAU, 
pp.347-348); or what: “is a noteworthy balancing  of  the  competing  considerations  and  
may  be  regarded  as  groundbreaking  in light  of  the  fundamental  principle  in  
arbitration  that  parties  are  free  to  select a party representative of their choosing” 
(Edna SUSSMAN, Ethics in International Arbitration: Soft Law Guidance for 
Arbitrators and Party Representatives. Soft Law in International Arbitration. Editors: 
Lawrence W. Newmann/Michael J. Radine. JurisNet, LLC 2014, pp.253-254). 
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Other arbitration rules receive similar treatment, although 
sometimes through formulas that are not as imperative in regard to the 
application of the rules of soft law but serve the same practical purpose. 
For example, Article 1.1.1 of the Arbitration Rules of the Lagos Chamber 
of Commerce International Arbitration Center (LACIAC) (2016): 
“By accepting to act as Legal Practitioner or party representative in an 
arbitration conducted under the LACIAC Rules, a Legal Practitioner or 
party representative agrees to be guided by the above stated overriding objective 
and by the International Bar Association Guidelines on Party Representation 
in International Arbitration”. 
In addition to the agreement to incorporate the IBA Guidelines on 
Party Representation in the contract itself, or more appropriately in the 
arbitration agreement expressly or indirectly by reference, the Guidelines 
may be included later - once the dispute has arisen on the occasion of the 
First Procedural Order, and so the agreement will also involve the 
arbitrators, who sometimes suggest their incorporation to the parties. In 
addition, there is the recent tendency of arbitral institutions to 
recommend, with the help of the parties when necessary, the 
incorporation of soft law instruments either directly in their own 
arbitration regulations (i) or in line with other instruments (ii): 
(i) An example of the first is the Arbitration Rules of The 
Australian Center for International Commercial Arbitration, ACICA 
Rules, 2016, which establishes in article 8.2 that:  
“Each party shall use its best endeavours to ensure that its legal representatives 
comply with the International Bar Association Guidelines on Party 
Representation in International Arbitration in the version current at the 
commencement of the arbitration”. 
Likewise, the Arbitration Rules del Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of 
New Zealand (AMINZ Rules, 2017), Rule 14.2 on Party representation:  
“14.2. Unless the Parties agree otherwise and subject to any provision of these 
Rules to the contrary, the Parties and the Arbitral Tribunal shall have regard 
to, but will not be bound by, the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in 
International Arbitration and on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration, in each case as current at the Notice Date”28. 
 
                                                          
28 And also identical proposal in relation to the IBA Rules on Evidence, art.61.3: “Unless 
the Parties agree otherwise, and subject to the provisions of these Rules which may provide to the contrary, 
the Arbitral Tribunal shall have regard to, but not be bound by, the IBA Rules of Evidence as current 
at the Notice Date”. 
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(ii) An example of the latter is the Note to the parties and the arbitral 
tribunal on the conduct of arbitration in accordance with the ICC 
arbitration rules of February 1, 2019, No. 48, which, in relation to the 
conduct of the participants in the arbitration (section IV), encourages the 
parties and arbitral tribunals to take into account and, where appropriate, 
adopt the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in international 
arbitration. 
The fact that the ICC Note draws the attention of the parties and 
the arbitrators to the IBA Guidelines and therefore the possible inclusion 
of this soft law instrument as part of the agreement of the parties generates 
the perception and conviction of the arbitration community about the 
preferred solution to be given to the conflicts of interest object of this 
paper. 
3.2. THE INFLUENCE OF THE IBA GUIDELINES 5 AND 6 IN OTHER 
REGULATIONS 
Among the texts that follow the model of the IBA Guidelines 5 and 
6 on Party Representation, Article 18 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules (2014) 
is the most important one, since it was also the first arbitration rules to 
include regulation on party representatives29. It states that:  
18.3. Following the Arbitral Tribunal’s formation, any intended change or 
addition by a party to its legal representatives shall be notified promptly in 
writing to all other parties, the Arbitral Tribunal and the Registrar; and any 
such intended change or addition shall only take effect in the arbitration subject 
to the approval of the Arbitral Tribunal.  
18.4. The Arbitral Tribunal may withhold approval of any intended change 
or addition to a party’s legal representatives where such change or addition 
could compromise the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or the finality of 
any award (on the grounds of possible conflict or other like impediment). In 
deciding whether to grant or withhold such approval, the Arbitral Tribunal 
shall have regard to the circumstances, including: the general principle that a 
party may be represented by a legal representative chosen by that party, the 
stage which the arbitration has reached, the efficiency resulting from 
maintaining the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal (as constituted 
throughout the arbitration) and any likely wasted costs or loss of time resulting 
from such change or addition. 
                                                          
29 The LCIA Arbitration Rules were the first to regulate the ethics of legal representatives: 
Vicent. S. DATTILO, Ethics in International Arbitration: A Critical Examination of the 
LCIA General Guidelines for the Parties´ Legal Representatives. Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 2016, vol.44, p.647, p.649 and p.650.  
Also included are the arbitration rules that apply the LCIA Rules, such as the Dubai 
International Financial Centre. See. DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Rules, 1 October 2016; or 
LCIA/MIAC Arbitration Rules, 2018.  
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Subsequently, other arbitration rules or other soft law texts have 
followed these regulations. For example, article 21, sections 1 and 2, of 
the Rules of Arbitration of the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution 
(1 October 2017) 
“1. (…) that there shall be no addition to any party’s legal representatives 
following the appointment of the arbitral tribunal without the prior written 
approval of the arbitral tribunal.  
2. The arbitral tribunal may decline to approve an addition to any party’s 
legal representatives if, on proper disclosure, a relationship exists between the 
proposed additional legal representative and any member of the arbitral 
tribunal that would create a conflict of interest jeopardizing the composition of 
the arbitral tribunal or the integrity of the proceedings”. 
Likewise, and without prejudice to the incorporation by reference of 
the entire IBA Rules in section 2, Rule 14.1 on Party representation of the 
Arbitration Rules of the Arbitrators ’and Mediators’ Institute of New 
Zealand (2017) establishes that: 
“14.1. Any addition or change to a Party’s legal representation after the issue 
of the Notice of Arbitration and the Answer (as appropriate) must be notified 
to the other Parties and to the Arbitral Tribunal within 7 days of such 
addition or change. The Parties agree that, in order to ensure the integrity of 
the proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may refuse to permit a Party’s added 
or changed legal representative to appear where the appearance of such legal 
representative might arguably require the recusal of a member of the Arbitral 
Tribunal”. 
It is also the focus of the recent Code of Good Arbitration Practices 
of the Spanish Club of Arbitration of 2019 (CBBPP/CEA), which 
replaces the previous Code of 2005 that was intended exclusively for 
arbitration institutions, while the new one makes recommendations to 
arbitrators, arbitral institutions, lawyers, experts, and third-party funders. 
The CCBBPP/CEA in relation to the appointment of Lawyers establishes 
that30: 
”108 The parties shall be free to appoint and dismiss their lawyers. 
109 The parties shall identify all of the lawyers who are advising them. This 
disclosure must be made as soon as possible after their engagement, by providing their 
names and addresses and attaching their authorisations. 
                                                          
30 The English text can be found at: https://www.clubarbitraje.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Code-of-Best-Practices-in-Arbitration-of-the-Spanish-
Arbitration-Club.pdf. 
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110 In the event of the dismissal or resignation of all of a party’s lawyers, without 
the appointment of their successors within a time that is reasonable or otherwise 
established by the arbitrators, it shall be understood that the party is representing itself. 
111 Once the arbitrators have been appointed, if changes occur within the initially 
appointed legal teams, then the arbitrators may, after hearing the parties, reject those 
changes in a reasoned decision, with a view to safeguarding the integrity of the proceeding. 
112 The integrity of the proceeding shall be deemed adversely affected in the 
following circumstances: 
a) If the party instituting the change is acting with dilatory intent or in abuse of 
process; or 
b) If there is a conflict of interest between the new lawyer and any of the 
arbitrators”. 
3.3. THE REGULATIONS UNDER REVIEW: SIMILARITIES  
Contrasting the solutions expressly accepted in the aforementioned 
texts leads us to the conclusion that there is great convergence when 
addressing the issue at hand, and that the differences are minimal, 
although it is also worth highlighting that their objective is that the terms 
of the debate can be established within a future International Code of 
Ethics (infra 3.4). 
The different regulations accept the conflict of interest between the 
legal representatives of the party and the arbitrator when a change is made 
in the former during the arbitral procedure, but they do not expressly 
address the reverse situation, which, however, can be treated under the 
general rules on independence and impartiality, which would imply the 
duty of the arbitrator to resign from the procedure, and his resistance 
could imply his removal by the competent body31.  
The essential principle that derives from all the regulations is that 
there is no absolute and unlimited right of the parties to the arbitration to 
change or modify the legal representation during the arbitration 
procedure. Therefore, although at a first sight it seems that there is a 
contradiction between two opposing rights that seem to be conceived as 
fundamental and equal -the right of the parties to choose their lawyer and 
the right to have an independent and impartial arbitrator32-, the principle 
                                                          
31 In one case, it was indicated that: “It may be said that such conflicts are bound to arise, 
especially in large international law firms. But this risk is known by their lawyers and such 
conflicts, whenever they arise, may be best dealt with internally (i.e. within the law firm) 
and not be resolved at the expense of the opposing party whose trust in the arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence might be otherwise be broken”, LCIA Reference No. 
111947, Decision Rendered 4 September 2012, nº42. 
32 On this issue, I have previously written indicating that they are not rights that are on 
an equal footing either from the constitutional perspective of the rights, nor from the 
perspective of their analysis under the arbitrations law. See Pilar PERALES 
VISCASILLAS, Capítulo 2. La integridad del procedimiento arbitral. Anuario de 
Arbitraje 2019. Madrid: Civitas, 2019. 
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that prevails is that the right of the parties to modify their legal 
representation is subject to not creating a conflict of interest with the 
arbitrators33.  
The second essential principle that is drawn from these regulations 
is that arbitrators have the power to decide about this conflict of interest 
and, therefore, they can reach a decision whether to authorize the change 
or remove the lawyer from the procedure. In the absence of explicit 
regulation in the arbitration laws34, it is considered that there is an implicit 
power of the Arbitral Tribunal to decide those issues that may affect the 
integrity of the arbitration procedure35, and for this purpose various 
arguments have been resorted to: it falls within the inherent powers of 
arbitrators, it is a reflection of the principles of good faith, the right to due 
process or an efficient procedure, etc. With greater or lesser nuances, this 
has been considered in jurisprudence, especially in relation to cases 
regarding investment arbitration, which has been enthusiastically followed 
by the doctrine and interest groups, that have expressly accepted that 
power for the arbitrators in the different instruments of soft law. The 
                                                          
33 See further: Pilar PERALES VISCASILLAS, La integridad del procedimiento arbitral 
(El Conflicto de interés entre abogados y árbitros). Anuario de Arbitraje 2019. Civitas: 
Thomson-Reuters, 2019, pp.43-88.  
34 Section 1042 (2) Procedural Civil Code (Germany): “Lawyers (“Rechtsanwälte”) may 
not be excluded from acting as authorised representatives”. Simlarly, Canon IV C of The 
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, American Arbitartion 
Association (1 March  2004): “The arbitrator should not deny any party the opportunity 
to be represented by counsel or by any other person chosen by the party”. 
35 International Law Association, ILA Resolution nº4/2016, Inherent and implied powers of 
International Arbitral Tribunals Recommendations, adopted at the 77ª ILA Conference, 
Johannesburg, South Africa, 7-11 August, 2016, 7.c) considering as part of the inherent 
powers of the arbitrators those that are necessary “to preserve jurisdiction, maintain the 
integrity of proceedings, and render an enforceable award”; and 2.b) iii): “inherent power: 
Arbitral tribunals should consider whether the issue before them risks undermining their 
jurisdiction, impugning the integrity of proceedings, or leading to their issuing an 
unenforceable award”. And Margaret MOSES, ‘The Growth of Arbitrator Power to 
Control Counsel Conduct’, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, November 12 2014. 
Without considering it irrelevant, but considering that the issue is no longer discussed: 
“it is now well-established that tribunals have jurisdiction to assess counsel conflicts of 
interest and, when appropriate, exclude counsel (or experts)”: Catherine A. ROGERS, 
and A. WIKER, “Fraport v. Philippines, ICSID, and Counsel Disqualification: The 
Power and the Praxis” (November 28, 2014). Journal of World Investment and Trade, 2014, 
p.8.  
Even the ASA, especially critical in general with the IBA Guidelines on Party 
Representation understands this: GEISINGER/SCHNEIDER/DASSER, nº2.1: “Under 
most if not all frequently used arbitration rules arbitrators have, expressly or implicitly, the powers to 
ensure the “fundamental fairness and integrity” of the proceedings”.  
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clearest example in case law is the Hrvatska Case36, which is not 
contradicted, despite the harsh criticism made by the Rompetrol Case, where 
it was considered that these powers should only be exercised in 
extraordinary circumstances37.  
Regarding this inherent power of the Arbitral Tribunal, it must be 
able to be exercised either when a specific request to change one of the 
lawyers is made, or when it is made to change the law firm as a whole, 
which logically also implies the individual lawyers. The distinction between 
whether the Arbitral Tribunal could only have jurisdiction over individual 
lawyers, but not over the Law firm will not make sense when the conflict 
of interest is provoked precisely in relation to the Law firm itself. 
Otherwise, the change of individually affected lawyers would not be 
sufficient to resolve certain conflicts of interest. 
A third point of coincidence between the texts being compared is 
that both regulate the protection of the integrity of the arbitration 
procedure and the protection of the fair conduct of the arbitration 
proceedings, so that both the conflict of interest object of this paper as 
well as other situations that relate more to the malpractice of lawyers are 
jointly regulated. As it has been previously seen, the latest situations are 
those whose regulation provokes the more radical criticisms to the IBA 
Guidelines on Party Representation. However, the fact that they are 
regulated in the same instrument does not mean that the treatment and 
legal answers to be given to these issues ought to be identical, and indeed, 
                                                          
36 See. Also considering positively the powers of the arbitral tribunal on the basis of that 
case: Alexis MOURRE, Chapter 25: About Procedural Soft Law, the IBA Guidelines on 
Party Representation and the Future of Arbitration, in SHAUGHNESSY, P., and 
TUNG, S., (eds), The Powers and Duties of an Arbitrator: Liber Amicorum Pierre A. Karrer, 
Kluwer Law International, 2017, p.248: “The ICSID Arbitral Tribunal in Hvratska was right 
in considering that “as a judicial formation governed by public international law, the Tribunal has an 
inherent power to take measures to preserve the integrity of its proceedings”, which entails the power to 
exclude a newly introduced counsel from a hearing when his representation of a party would create a 
situation of conflict of interest such as to imperil the constitution of the tribunal; We do not see any reason, 
though, why the same proposition should not be true in commercial arbitration. Depriving the arbitral 
tribunal of such powers would have highly undesirable consequences”. See further: Jeffry 
WAINCYMER, Reconciling Conflicting Rights in International Arbitration: The Right 
to Choice of Counsel and the Right to an Independent and Impartial Tribunal, Arbitration 
International, 26, 2010, nº4, pp.614 et seq. Commenting precisely on Article 17 of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, it is considered that the doctrine of the implicit powers 
of the arbitral tribunal may play a residual role when the tribunal proposes an unusual 
procedural measure as in the case at hand, citing the Hvratska Case. See. Jan 
PAULSSON/Georgios PETROCHILOS, UNCITRAL Arbitration. Wolters Kluwer, 
2018, p.122. 
37 Rompetrol Case, nº15: “It plainly follows that a control of that kind would fall to be exercised rarely, 
and then only in compelling circumstances”. In fact, the doctrine that has analyzed the case 
coincides by pointing out that the Court in Rompetrol is really considering that it has 
implicit jurisdiction to decide on the removal of a lawyer in order to preserve the 
arbitration procedure. See. WAINCYMER, p.608. 
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as we shall see, the legal situations and the corresponding legal responses 
can be perfectly separated. 
In the absence of legal definitions of what should be understood by 
the integrity of the arbitration procedure and about the reasons for its 
special protection, it is useful to refer to the definitions established 
jurisprudentially or doctrinally. For the integrity of the arbitration 
procedure we can consider the principle established in the Hrvatska Case38:  
“The Tribunal's obligation as guardian of the legitimacy of the arbitral process 
is to make every effort to ensure that the Award is soundly based and not 
affected by procedural imperfection”. 
The Arbitral Tribunal conveys in the Hrvatska case a known 
principle in arbitration: the duty of the arbitral tribunal to render an award 
that is valid and, therefore, enforceable, hence the breach of the duty of 
independence/impartiality would jeopardize the enforceability of the 
award39, which means contrasting this issue with the public order of the 
State where recognition will be sought. 
Although this duty of the Arbitral Tribunal is not always expressly 
adopted in many Arbitration Laws, including the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration, it is an explicit duty in relation 
to precisely two of the texts we are commenting on: the Rules of the IBA 
on Party Representation and also Article 18.4 LCIA Arbitration Rules that 
refer to “the finality of any award”. More generally, it is also observed that 
some arbitration rules, notably the ICC Rules (Art.41), extend said 
obligation to the Court itself, which is important in the case at hand 
because the Court is responsible for deciding on the refusal of the 
arbitrators. 
However, the integrity of the arbitration procedure cannot only be 
related to the enforceability of the award, especially if it is thought that the 
award could potentially be recognized and executed in multiple countries 
since it is also connected with the very essence of the arbitration and its 
legitimacy. The foregoing does not prevent, but rather advises, that the 
arbitrators have in mind the potential countries of execution when issuing 
the award and, in particular, the issues related to public order as a reason 
for denial of the enforcement. Also, the court in the Hvratska Case alluded 
to the principle of immutability of an arbitral tribunal validly constituted 
to justify the removal of the new lawyer: 
                                                          
38 Hrvatska Case, nº15. 
39 Fernando PÉREZ LOZADA, Duty to render enforceable awards: the specific case of 
impartiality and independence, Spain Arbitration Review, 2016, nº27, p.72. 
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“Even fundamental principles must, however, give way to overriding 
exceptions. In this case, the overriding principle is that of the immutability of 
properly constituted tribunals (Article 56(1) of the ICSID Convention)”40.  
The other great principle, that of the fair conduct of the procedure, 
was established in the Fraport case where the power of the arbitrators was 
also considered to control the proper and fair conduct of the procedure 
(fair conduct of the proceedings): 
“obligation to make sure that generally recognized principles relating to conflict 
of interest and the protection of the confidentiality of information imparted by 
clients to their lawyers are complied with (Fraport Case)”41. 
In Fraport, unlike Hvratska, the conflict of interest occurred between 
a party and its lawyer, and on this the Tribunal stated that it could not 
pronounce on "the deontological responsibilities or jurisdiction over the parties’ legal 
representatives in their own capacities"42, that is to say, that there is no power to rule 
on an allegation of misconduct under any such professional rules as may apply”43.  
The IBA Guidelines mix the different situations of conflict and 
malpractice under a single instrument and merge the two principles as if 
they were one: The Task Force undertook to determine whether such differing norms 
and practices may undermine the fundamental fairness and integrity of international 
arbitral proceedings”44. And Rule 1, and its comments: “the integrity and fairness 
of the arbitral proceedings”, to which the effectiveness and enforceability of 
the award are added in the commentary to Rules 26-27: “to preserve the 
integrity, effectiveness and fairness of the arbitration and the enforceability of the award”. 
Logically, the IBA Guidelines do so because, when considering the 
different approaches under the three investment arbitration cases already 
referred to, they needed to support and justify the policy legislative 
decisions adopted in the text, that is, to expressly confer power on 
arbitrators to punish lawyers in cases of malpractice, and regardless of 
whether they formally want to maintain deference for professional 
standards of ethics that are not displaced by the text of the IBA. However, 
the IBA Guidelines did not intend to invest the arbitrators with powers 
that are reserved for professional associations45. It is thus possible to base 
a very different result to that derived from both the Fraport Case as we have 
seen, as from the Rompetrol Case, since in the latter it was seriously 
questioned that, on the basis of the Hvratska Case, it could be considered 
                                                          
40 Hvratska Case, nº25. 
41 Fraport Case, nº37, also pointing out that: “Indeed, such principles are of fundamental importance 
to the fairness of the arbitration process”. 
42 Fraport Case, nº39. 
43 Fraport Case, nº39. 
44 Preamble to the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation.  
45 Rule 3. And Preamble to the IBA Guidelines on Party Representation. 
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a more general principle that allowed to exclude a lawyer from the 
procedure46. 
That the drafters of the IBA Guidelines seem to have been aware of 
this merger of the two principles is revealed when examining Rules 4-6, 
which deal with the cases covered by this work and that only expressly 
refer to the integrity of the procedure both in the Rule specifically 
considers (Rule 5) as in the commentary to them, as compared to Rules 
26-27, which consider the two principles as a unit. In fact, the IBA Rules, 
although they certainly regulate both issues in the same instrument, seem 
to consider them from a different angle and in separate provisions to the 
other issues that are understood as lawyer´s malpractice. 
Moreover, a different perspective of legislative policy is also 
observed regarding the applicable remedies, possibly because the drafters 
were aware of the criticisms that would arise from regulating the issues of 
lawyers' malpractice. While for the breach of Rule 5 the possible exclusion 
of the representative from his participation, totally or partially, is expressly 
provided for in the procedure, Rule 26 on remedies for improper conduct 
fails to mention the possible removal of the representative, although it 
may be considered within letter d) of Rule 26 which, as a tailor's box, 
provides that the arbitrators may adopt any appropriate measure aimed at 
maintaining the justice and integrity of the procedure. 
That said, what seems to be evident from the IBA text is that the 
conflict between lawyers and arbitrators such as that expressed in Rule 5, 
if necessary, can cause the lawyer to be removed regardless of the reason 
that generated it, that is,  regardless of whether the change has been made 
legitimately or with another intention: to delay the procedure, boycott it, 
or any other reckless conduct or in bad faith. When the conflict of interest 
has arisen between the lawyer and the arbitrator, if it is serious enough, 
only the removal of the lawyer will be possible. If the conflict is not serious 
enough to justify the removal, and if, in addition, such change responds 
to illegitimate or spurious reasons, the lawyer may be sanctioned in milder 
ways, such as those indicated in Rule 26. Outside these cases, it seems that 
the malpractice of the lawyer or representative would not justify the 
extreme sanction of his expulsion. 
This approach is also continued by the LCIA text. The Regulation 
further emphasizes the treatment of different matters, although without 
directly referring to any principle but by reference to the principle of “fair, 
efficient and expeditious means for the final resolution of the parties' dispute”, since it 
deals in the same article with all the variety of phenomena (arts. 18.3 and 
4, on the one hand, and 18.5, on the other), although in terms of remedies 
the same approach as the IBA Guidelines is followed. The LCIA Rules 
regulates the principles and rules of conduct in articles 18.5 and in the 
Annex, as well as the sanctions in section 6 of article 18, avoiding referring 
to the possible expulsion of the lawyer. Even in the case of the LCIA 
                                                          
46 Rompetrol Case, nº22-23. 
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Rules, there is still greater prevention as I will indicate later in the following 
section. 
On the other hand, the new CCBBPP/CEA (2019) only refers to the 
principle of the integrity of the procedure and giving a definition to it in 
which the two types of matters or issues are clearly integrated (nº112):  
The integrity of the proceeding shall be deemed adversely affected in the following 
circumstances: 
a) If the party instituting the change is acting with dilatory intent or in 
abuse of process; or 
b) If there is a conflict of interest between the new lawyer and any of the 
arbitrators. 
Undoubtedly, the commented texts could have kept the two issues 
and the principles separate, since, as indicated very correctly, in relation to 
the issue at hand, it is not about disciplining the lawyer47 but to determine 
if a party that can endanger the integrity of the procedure can be allowed 
to have an unlimited right to change lawyers48. Rather: “It is that 
disqualification of counsel must rest on the same basis that---had the argument been 
made---would justify the disqualification of a member of the tribunal. And this is as it 
should be, for in either case the gravamen of the complaint is to raise precisely the same 
doubts about the integrity of the decision-making process”49.  
Leaving aside a purist perspective in legal interpretation, and if we 
consider that we are faced with principles that do not have a uniform 
formulation50 and that can be interpreted broadly51, there should not be 
                                                          
47 For example, they seem to observe the issue as a sanction: CASTELLO, pp.363-364, 
commenting art.21 of the Bahrein Arbitration Rules; and Guideline 1.2 SIArb Guidelines 
on Party-Representative Ethics, 26 April 2018: “A Party Representative shall not abuse 
the arbitral process or its procedures”, pointing out in the Comment to situations related 
to this paper where: “deliberately timed last-minute amendments, or other applications 
to the Tribunal or the courts, intended solely to harass the opponent or cause unnecessary 
delay or disruption to the arbitral process”. 
48 WAINCYMER, p.612. 
49 RAU, nº25.  
50 Legitimacy, in addition to transparency, often evokes notions of good governance and predictability: 
Doak BISHOP/Margrete STEVENS, The Compelling Need for a Code of Ethics in 
International Arbitration: Transparency, Integrity and Legitimacy, p.15. 
Integrity of the procedure understood as affecting the pillars of the right to due process: 
MADALENA/RIVERA, p.92. 
51 For example, considering situations that would enter as “guerrilla tactics,” the arbitral 
tribunal in the case of Libananco Holdings Co Limited (Claimant) and Republic of 
Turkey (Respondent) (ICSID Case, No.arb/ 06/8) Decision on preliminary issues, 23 
June 2008, issued one month after the Hvratska Case, considered the principle of integrity 
and that of good, nº78:“it must be regarded as endowed with the inherent powers 
required to preserve the integrity of its own process – even if the remedies open to it are 
necessarily different from those that might be available to a domestic court of law in an 
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major inconveniences in merging the two issues under the integrity 
principle of the arbitration procedure, as does the CCBBPP/CEA. For the 
supporters of its regulation, the unification of both matters under the 
principle of the integrity of the procedure undoubtedly presents an 
advantage  in that it grants power to the arbitrators and the sanctions to 
be imposed under the lens of the Hvratska Case  while trying to get as far 
away as possible from the interference with the principles and rules of 
professional ethics that may be applicable. It will not be surprising, 
therefore, that one of the defenses against critics of the IBA Guidelines 
affects this point: 
“The IBA Party Representation Guidelines are strictly limited to matters 
pertaining to the conduct of the procedure. They do not include anything, for 
example, about attorney’s fees or attorney-client relationship. Every single issue 
that is dealt with in the Guidelines pertains to the preservation of the integrity 
and fairness of the proceedings (…). The starting point is that arbitral 
tribunals have the power to deal with matters of counsel conduct, insofar as 
measures are necessary to ensure the integrity of the arbitral proceedings”52.  
These other cases of necessary protection of the integrity of the 
arbitration procedure may arise on the occasion of a variety of situations 
related, for example, to the inappropriate conduct of lawyers (verbal or 
physical aggression, or those known as “guerrilla tactics, for example, in 
the case at hand, it could be the choice of a lawyer that creates a conflict 
with the court to “torpedo” the procedure)53, which may lead to the 
                                                          
ICSID Member State. The Tribunal would express the principle as being that parties have 
an obligation to arbitrate fairly and in good faith and that an arbitral tribunal has the 
inherent jurisdiction to ensure that this obligation is complied with; this principle applies 
in all arbitration, including investment arbitration, and to all parties, including States (even 
in the exercise of their sovereign powers)”. 
52 See. MOURRE, Chapter 25, p.248.  
53 DASSER, A critical analysis, p.41; Tom CUMMINS, The IBA Guidelines on Party 
Representation in International Arbitration – Levelling the Playing Field?, Arbitration 
International, 2014, vol.30, nº3, p.439, and p.448; and Edna SUSSMAN/Solomon 
EBERE, All’s fair in love and war – or is it? Reflections on ethical standards for counsel 
in international arbitration, The American Review of International Arbitration (ARIA), 
2011, vol.22, nº4, p.612, who conducted their study in relation to the so-called "guerrilla 
tactics" and without giving a definition of what should be understood by guerrilla tactics, 
respondents were free to consider certain behaviors as such, in particular the creation of 
conflicts, citing as a relevant example the cases of change of lawyer during the arbitration 
process to create a conflict with an arbitrator. 
A curious and possibly almost impossible example in practice would be that of a 
defendant's lawyer who nominates a series of arbitrators with obvious conflicts of interest 
in the hope of sabotaging the procedure with the inevitable incidents of recusal. (William 
W. PARK, A Fair Fight: Professional Guidelines in International Arbitration. Boston 
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arbitrators having to take measures aimed at ensuring such protection54. 
In these situations, sanctions might be available in the distribution of 
costs55. Otherwise, the conflict must be resolved ex-ante. 
Accordingly, and depending on the circumstances, arbitrators can 
deal with issues related to the exclusion of the procedure of a lawyer or an 
expert56. 
3.4. THE REGULATIONS UNDER REVIEW: DIFFERENCES 
Regarding the different perspectives adopted by the texts mentioned, 
and while recognizing that some arbitration rules have decided not to 
regulate these situations57, it has been rightly pointed out that: “The LCIA 
                                                          
University School of Law Working Paper, nº14-53 (October 7, 2014), p.14, who seems, 
however, to forget that this also requires the cooperation of successive arbitrators).  
54 In favor of considering that arbitrators not only have the power but also the duty to 
sanction unethical conduct or contrary to the ethics of the lawyer based on the safeguard 
of the integrity of the arbitration procedure: MADALENA/RIVERA, pp.91-94; and 
Ignacio MADALENA, Ethics in International Arbitration, Int. A.L.R., 2012, 15(6) 
pp.251-254, both in general and in particular in the case of the conflict of interest object 
of this work, also indicating that the powers of the arbitrators would not be extended to 
lawyers if these are issues that do not have a direct impact on the procedure. There are, 
however, jurisdictions contrary to the arbitrators being able to decide on the removal of 
lawyers in cases of conflict of interest between the lawyer and the party, as is the case in 
the US legal system, see: O. FRANCO PUJOL/O.  MUÑOZ ROJO, La remoción del 
abogado en el arbitraje internacional. ¿Una alternativa viable?. CIARGlobal, abril 2018, 
pp.16-17. 
55 This type of conflict and its reflection in costs is referred to by The ICC Commission 
Report, Decisions on costs in International Arbitration. ICC Dispute Resolution Bulletin 2015, 
Issue 2, p.16: “(iii) Post-formation conflicts aimed at destabilizing the tribunal and the arbitration. 
These result, for example, from counsel appointments late in the proceedings that create a conflict of 
interest for an arbitrator. The arbitrator in question may be forced to resign, otherwise the enforceability 
of the award could be jeopardized. The tribunal may take into account any tactic deployed by a party to 
create such a conflict, and any costs arising out of such conduct”. 
56 Flughafen Zürich AG v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB/10/19, Decision on Proposal 
for Disqualification of Expert Witness and Exclusion of Evidence, 29 August 2012. The 
arbitral tribunal, under the chairmanship of Juan Fernández-Armesto, considered a case 
where the expert had received confidential information from the plaintiff so that he could 
present his financial offer of professional services, being that he finally served as the 
defendant's expert. The Court considered its jurisdiction on the basis of rule 34.1 that 
empowers the Court to decide on the admissibility of the evidence, and considered that 
it was not appropriate to exclude the expert because the information was not given 
confidentially, and the expert acknowledged that there was no read or disposed of it 
(nº34-38).  
57 FRANCO PUJOL/MUÑOZ ROJO, footnote 83 refer to the Arbitration Rules of The 
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) that, although they initially foresaw the 
power of the arbitral tribunal to exclude a representative, they did not include it in the 
final text. It also does not appear in the new Regulation of November 1, 2018 that 
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‘approval’ and IBA ‘exclusion’ would normally lead to the same result. However, the 
LCIA formulation may have the merit of connoting respect for the parties’ original 
position, and certainly sounds less aggressive than disqualification”58.  
They escape, however, from that approach, not being indifferent the 
orientation of the announced rules, the situations in which the change of 
law firm occurs, which are not contemplated under the IBA Rules or 
under other texts that follow its formulation as art.21.1 Rules of Arbitration 
of the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (1 October 2017). On the other 
hand, those situations could be understood within the scope of the LCIA 
that refers to any intended change (...) by a party to its legal representatives. Or 
under the CCBBP/CEA which refers in general to any modification in the 
legal representation. 
However, in this case, neither the formulation of the LCIA59 nor that 
of the CCBBP/CEA serve to resolve the conflict of interest when there is 
a change of law firm for an elementary reason: they follow a preventive 
model based on authorization, and it is more than evident that the arbitral 
tribunal has no power to authorize or disallow the professional destiny of 
the group of lawyers; furthermore, it seems that both the formulation of 
the LCIA and of the CCBBP/CEA60 do not give powers to the arbitrators 
to decide on the expulsion of the lawyer. 
In this regard, it is to be noted that the text of the LCIA, as well as 
the CCBBPP/CEA, avoids referring expressly to the exclusion of the 
lawyer as one of the measures that could be taken in the case of non-
compliance with the ethical rules. Even in the case of the CCBBPP/CEA, 
it could have been understood differently if this power of the arbitrators 
had finally been adopted expressly in the CEA Model Arbitration Rules of 
the same date, since in accordance with article 26.2, it is established that 
among the powers of the arbitrator are Adopting measures to maintain the 
                                                          
establishes in its articles 13.6 and 13.7 the free election of the representatives, although 
subject to the principles of a fair and effective conduct of the procedure, as well as the 
obligation to promptly communicate the change in legal representation once the Arbitral 
Tribunal has been constituted. 
58 PARK, A Fair Fight, p.24; W.W. PARK, Equality of Arms in Arbitration: Costs and 
Benefits, in V. Heuzé et al. (eds.), Mélanges en l’honneur de Pierre Mayer 663 (LGDJ 2015), 
p.24. See also: FRANCO PUJOL/MUÑOZ ROJO, p.12. 
59 Nor that of other Regulations as derived from Article 21.2 of the Rules of Arbitration of 
the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution (1 October 2017).  
60 Later the Code refers to possible penalties without specifically mentioning the possible 
removal of the lawyer:132 If a lawyer breaches any of the duties described in this Section, then the 
arbitrators, after hearing both parties and the lawyer concerned, may adopt any of the following measures: 
a) Caution the lawyer verbally or in writing; 
b) Draw adverse inferences when evaluating the evidence; 
c) Take the lawyer’s conduct into consideration when awarding costs; 
d) Notify the matter to any Bar Associations with which the lawyer is registered, for the determination 
of ethical responsibilities; and 
e) Adopt any other measure in order to preserve the integrity of the proceedings. 
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integrity of the proceeding, including written or verbal cautions to the lawyers, but the 
last sentence of this rule or order the change of lawyers or experts was finally 
deleted in the final draft 
Continuing with the differences, the aforementioned texts adopt 
different solutions to solve the problem that oscillate between preventive 
measures (ex-ante) (or authorization model) aimed at requesting 
authorization from the arbitral tribunal to authorize/reject the 
modification of the legal equipment (example of the LCIA and 
CCBBPP/CEA), and resolving measures (or sanctioning model) that even 
pointing out the duty of not creating inappropriate relationships resolves 
the conflict (ex-post) preventing the participation of the representative 
(example, IBA Guidelines), without prejudice to a mixed criterion61. 
4. CONCLUSIONS  
The analysis carried out in this paper leads us to the following 
conclusions: 
(i) A trend in international arbitration has been consolidated 
by which, under the principles of protection of the integrity of the 
arbitral procedure and immutability of the arbitral tribunal that has 
been validly constituted and that of the fair conduct of the 
procedure, arbitrators have the power to resolve the conflict of 
interest that arises between the right to an independent arbitrator 
and the right to choose a lawyer when there is an intention to 
change the latter. This right of the parties is subject to the duty of 
not creating inappropriate relationships with the members of the 
arbitral tribunal. 
(ii) The arbitrators, in deciding on the indicated conflict, have 
the power to decide the removal of the lawyer. 
(iii) The differences between the rules of arbitration and 
other soft law instruments, as they have been analyzed, do not 
have enough weight or entity to distort the conclusions reached. 
(iv) Future regulation of this issue either in line with the 
arbitration regulations themselves or in an Code of Ethics for 
Arbitrators or Lawyers should respond broadly to the problem at 
hand by means of a wording that includes both the situations of 
incorporation of a new lawyer and the change of the law firm, 
while accepting a preventive (ex ante) and conflict resolution (ex 
post) approach. 
                                                          
61 In a way, this approach is found in the Arbitration Rules del Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ 
Institute of New Zealand (2017), Rule 14 on Party representation. 
